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report and the rendition of final judgment, the defendant moved
to set the judgment aside, which motion was overruled, excep.
tions taken, and the case brought here by appeal.
There is no pretense that the land taken wag not assessed at its
true value, although it is urged that the commissioners failed to
take into consideration the value of a crop of corn growing upon
the premises, and that this fact is shown by the report. The' report shows no such fact, and the objection fails. In my opinion
the judgment should be affirmed. The other judges concur.
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BILLs AND NOTES.

A ZRegpiable Promissory Note--What Is.---.An
trument of
the tenor.following: "Nobleboro, October 4, 1869.
iathaniel 0.
Winslow Cr. By labor 161 days @ $4. per day 46T00. Good
to bearer. Wm. Vannah,1-is a negotiable promissory note for
sixty-seven dollars, payable to Nathaniel.O. Winslow, or bearer,
on demand: Hussey v. Winslow, 59 Me.
PromissoryNote- Gonstretiraof-Evidence in Action on.The liability of the defendant, as the maker of a negotiable.promissory note, must be determined by the instrument alone; Sturdiirant v. flull, 59 Me.
A note of the tenor: ".ort1and, Dec. 20, 1869. Four months
after date, I promise to pay to the order of Sturdivaut & Co., two
hundred and twenty-five dollars. Value received. John T. Hull,
Treas. St. Paul's Parish," binds Hull, personally; and it cannot
be shown, by parol, that the iiention of both parties, at the time
of giving the note, was that the parish and not Hull should be
bound: .Id.
CONTRACT.-

Cnsiatysn-utuality.o-Statutec--Constructionof.-In the
trial of an action of assumpsit, on an account annexed, the defendant offered in evidence an unsealed written agreement, signed by
the plaintiffs and five other creditors of the defendant, therein stipulating to "take fifty per cent. of the amount due us in full, for
account against" him; and oral evidence that the defendant, prior
1 From W. W. Virgin, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 59 Maine Reports.
2 From J. 5. Stookett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 85 Maryland Reports.
3 From M.X. Clarke, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 22 M1ichgan Reports.
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to the commencement of this suit, presented to the plaintiffs the
draft of a third person, of an amount equal to fifty per cent. of the
account in suit, and claimed a receipt in full; but that the plain.
tiffs refused to accept the draft and give the receipt. Held (1),
That the evidence disclosed no consideration for or mutuality in
the written agreement; and (2) That the defense was not within
R. S. c. 82, § 38: Webb v. Stuart, 59 Me.
CORPORATION.

Legislative grant to a Railroad Company to cross a Turnpike.
Contract of a State with the Turnpike Company implied in its
Charter- Ultra vires.-The legislature, in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, can empower a railroad corporation to
cross another railroad or a turnpike road, on making compensation;
and, whatever damage may. result therefiom, the exercise of such
a right cannot be considered as the condemnation of a franchise,
nor the impairment of a contract within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States: Turnpike v. Union Railroad Co.,
35 Md.
A legislative grant of powers to a corporation sanctions only
such implied powers as are necessarily incident to those expressly
bestowed: Id.
The U. R, R. Co. was empowered by its charter to construct a
railway between two termini so situated as to make it necessary
to cross the B. and H. turnpike road. In addition to the main
stem, the R. R. Co. built a lateral road, which also crossed the
turnpike road, in order to connect with the P. W. & B. R. R.
Held, that the right to build the lateral road across the turnpike
could not arise by implication from a provision in the charter of
U. R. R. authorizing all railroad companies upon equal terms to
run their locomotives and cars over the tracks of the U. R. R. Co.:
Id.
Member of canmot make himself a creditorof, without authority.-A member of a corporation, who is not its financial officer,
cannot, without authority, make himself its creditor by the voluntary payment of its debts:
Blanchard v. .First Association of
Spiritualistsof Portland,59 Me.
The plaintiff, a member thereof, sued the corporation known as
the "First Association of Spiritualists," for a balance of an account wherein was charged various sums paid for rent, carpets,
furniture, gas and oil bills for their hall of worship, and credited
sums subscribed and contributed by differentmembers and received
from other persons for the use of the hall. The by-laws provided
for the election of a treasurer, who thereby had charge of the funds,
collections, and debts, and was required to pay the bills of the
association, ordered by "the government."
The plaintiff, with
others, having been appointed a "committee on the hall," without
any specific duties assigned, or powers conferred, purchased the
carpets, etc., for the association, and on its credit, considering
themselves personally bound to pay therefor, provided the association
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did not. ied, (1) Thattheplaintiff had no authority
himself creditor of the association; and (2) That the
the associatioh to accept the report of the committee
construed such a ratification as would authorize one
mittee to maintain the suit: Id,

thus tomake
bare vote of
could not be
of the com-

CnimmAL LAW.
!Thefact thatthe Defendantin Criminalprosecutiondid not Testify may be considered by the Jury.-Husband's coercion-presumption of.-Instruction.-In the trial of a married woman on
an indictment for being a common seller of intoxicating liquor, the
fact that she did not testify in her own behalf is proper to be considered by the jury in. determining the question of her guilt or innocence: State of Maine v. Cleaoes, 59 Me.
If a married woman sell intoxicating liquor contrary to law in
the presence of her husband, the law presumes that she acts under
the coercion of her husband; but this presumption may be rebutted: Id.
Hence, in the trial of a married woman on an indictment for
being a common seller of intoxicating. liquor, where it appeared
that at some of the sales her husband was present, the presiding
judge properly declined to instruct the jury, that if any of the
sales were made by the wife in the presence of her husband, shewould be presumed to act under his coercion, compulsion, or direction, and would not be liable for such sales: Id.
DEED

Evidence-ParolAgreement.-Evidence of a parol agreement
alleged to have accompanied the delivery of the deed, by- which,
upon certain conditions, the deed shbuld be re-delivered to the
grantor, is inadmissible, there being no evidence of fraud, or any
other circumstance which could prevent the operation of thp deed
as an absolute conveyance: Beers v. Beers, 22 Mich.
EASEMENT.

Estoppel--Extngishment and Abandonment of an Easement
-Constructive Notice-Power of Lessee to bind .ReversionerConstruction of Deeds.-Where G having been a party to a
chancery suit for the partition of real estate, wherein was included
a certain dominant tenement, afterward became seized of the servient tenement, it was Held, that G was not estopped, as
party to the chancery suit, from maintaining that, either by the
true construction of the title deeds creating the easement, or by
subsequent agreement of the parties in interest, the easement had
been extinguished: Glenn v. Davis, 35 Md.
An agreement by a lessee for years to abandon an easement
cannot bind the reversioner, unless he be a party to it, or it be madb
with his acquiescence: Id.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

Where a paper is not entitled by law to be recorded, placing it
upon record does not operate as constructive notice: Id.
A deed from W to B, made in 1823, conveying a lot on the
principal street, in the city of Baltimore, contained a stipulation
that notwithstanding a deviation of the existing partition wall
from the true dividing line between the lot therein described, and
the adjoining lot belonging to W, the said wall should remain undisturbed, "so long as the said houses shall endure." The houses
then existing, were two-story brick dwellings. In 1870, many
radical changes having meantime been madq in the condition of
the houses, and the house of the party claiming under B having
become incapable of safe and beneficial occupation, he sought to
build a new wall upon the true dividing line. Upon appeal
from an order granting an injunction against the disturbance of
the old wall, the true construction of the clause above quoted being disputed, it was Held, 1. That this provision must be
taken most favorably for the grantee. 2. That the evident design of this provision was, that whenever the grantee should find
it necessary, either by reason of the decaying condition of his
house, or its unfitness for the locality, to erect in its stead a
more substantial structure, suitable for the business purposes of
that part of the city, his enjoyment of the property according to
its true lines should no longer be restriited: Id.
EQUITY.

Bill to Quiet Title-Possesston.-Abill to quiet title, filed by
a complainant, who, though averring possession of the premises,
is not shown to be in actual possession, against a defendant shown
to be in possession, and nothing appearing to prevent proceedings
at law, cannot be maintained: Barron v. Bobbins, 22 Mich.
EXCEPTIONs, BILL oF.
Objection to the admissibility of Evidence.-From an order refusing to sign and seal a bill of exceptions, no appeal lies: Marsh
v. Hand, 35 Md.
Where a judge before whom a case is tried refuses to sign and
seal a bill of exception tendered in time under the rules of the
court, the party aggrieved by such refusal may have a compulsory writ from the Court of Chancery, grounded upon the Statute
of Westm. 2 (13 Edw. 1,) ch. 31, commanding the judge to sign
and seal the bill of exception; or he may apply to the Court of
Appeals, which has power to issue the compulsory writ under the
Statute, as incident to the proper exercise of its appellate jurisdiction: Id.
FORCInLE ENTRY.

Evidence.-On the trial of a complaint for a forcible entry, evidence of force employed to maintain a possesion is not admissible
to characterize, by relation, acts otherwise peaceable, by which the
possession had been previously obtained: Latimer v. Woodward,
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2 Doug. 368, and Seitz v. Miles, 16 Mich. 456, cited and approved: Hoffman v. Harrington,22 Mich.
Every forcible entry is forbidden; but a forcible detainer after
a peacable entry is not forbidden unless the detainer is unlawful;
and in neither case is the possessory remedy given to any one who
is not entitled to the poss.qssioA: Id.
INPANT.

Infant's .Contract-Rescission of by Administraior.-A contract between a minor and his master whereby the former paid
his bounty money to the latter in consideration of his consent to
the minor's enlistment, may, after the minor's decease, intestate,
be rescinded by the administrator of his estate, and the money recovered back: Dinsmore v. Webber, 59 Me.
INSURANCI.

Enforcement by an Insurance and Loan Company of thepay.
ment of the Weekly dues of a Member, by Finesand Forfeitures.The appellee, incorporated under the Act of 1868, cl. 471, loaned
to the appellant, a member of the corpora.tion, $6,000, on fifteen
shares of its stock held by him, re~payalde in weekly instalments,
including principal, interest and premium of $33.75, each, and
took from him a mortgage to secure the re-payment thereof. The
appellant'failed to pay the instalment due oh Monday, the 19th o$ -;n
December, 1870, but tendered the amount on the succeeding day;
the secretary of the corproation refused to receive it,' unless he
would pay the fine of $3.37 claimed to be due under a by-law of
the corporation, which provided that any person who refused to
pay his weekly dues at the time required, should be fined ten cents
weekly, for each and every dollar remaining unpaid. The appelant tendered on each suceeding Monday, up to the 16th of March,
1871,.the date of the passage of a decree for the sale of the wortgaged premises, the amount of the accrued and accruing instalments as named in the mortgage, but 'refused to pay the fines
claimed to be due by the appellee, and the appellee refused to
accept the instalments without the fines. Held: That while the
appellant, by his failure to pay phnctually the weekly instalment
due on the '19th of December, 1870, subjected himself to the fine
provided by a by-law of the appellee for such default, his tender
thereafter of the weekly instalments as the same fell due, exempted him from liability to further fines. His refusal to pay the first
fine did not give the appellee the right to impose additional fines:
Pentz v. Citizen's FireInsurance Co., 35 Md.
JUDGMENT.

Scire Faciasto Bevive-Plea of Payment and SatisfactionBvidence.-An agreement entered into prior to the date of a judgment, as to the mode of its discharge, but. which was not to be
executed until afterward, and all payments made in pursuance of
such agreement, are admissible in evidence in support of the plea of
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payment and satisfaction to a scire facias to revive the judgment: Downey v. Forrester,35 Mdd.
A being indebted to B on a promissory note in the sum of $447,
it was agreed that A would continue to pay the dues on ten shares
of Building Association stock held by him, until the payment
should equal the amount of his indebtedness, and in case he did
not otherwise discharge such indebtedness, he would transfer the
stock in payment thereof. Subsequently, on the 3d of August,
1867, A confessed judgment for $449.39,:in favor of B. At the
time of the agreement,.$90 had been paid into the Building Association on the stock, and A continued to pay the sum of $5 weekly
until June, 1868, when the money on the shares amounting to
$642, was drawn out by B, it being agreed that the same should
be applied to the note for which the judgment was confessed. On
the 3d of September, 1870, B sued, out a scire facias to revive
the judgment. A pleaded payment and satisfaction. Held, 1.
That in support of this plea, evidence of ithe receipt by B of the
sum of $642, was admissible, the same having been received by
him subsequently to the date of the judgment. 2. That the deposits in the Building Association from time to time, on the shares
of stock, were not payments to B as of the date when made; being left to accumulate under the agreement, they constituted but
one payment when received by him in the aggregate: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Mutual and open Account-Non-residence, and absence from
the State--Residence--Domicil.-Items of credit to defendant
entered on plaintiff's books for goods or money "returned," have
no tendency to prove the existence of a mutual and open account
between the plaintiff and defendant, within the meaning of § 5361
Comp. Laws. Such entries denote merely that the transactions
to which they relate are stricken out of the account entirely:
Campbell v. White, 22 Mich.
Neither absence from the State, nor residence out of it, will, of
itself, suspend the running of the statute of limitations within the
meaning of § 5369 Comp. Laws: both must exist to take the case
out of the statute. Where the absence has not been continuous,
the different occasions when the debtor has been within the State
-if his presence were sufficiently notorious, or continued for such
length of time as would afford the creditor, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, a fair opportunity to subject the debtor to the
service of process-may be reckoned together, and during the
period thus computed, the statute will run;! it being the legislative
intent that the operation of the exception should be concurrent
with the existence of the obstacle which prevents a service upon
the debtor: Id.
Residence out of the State, in order to take a case out of the statute
of limitations, must be something more than a mere place of abode;
it must be the domicil of the party, which can only be in one place;
and it must have the incidents, which may vary under different
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circumstances, but which determine the place of his home, which
he has adopted with the intention of remaining, and to which,
when he is absent, he intends to return: Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Claim by Lessees for a Covenant in the Lease, exempting
them from Liabilityfor Damage by fire to the Premises, resulting from their own Negligence.-A receiver appointed to take
charge of certain trust property, entered into a written agreement
to lease a house and lot, part of the trust estate, for a term of
five years, at a specified annual rent-the agreement to be subject
to the approval of the Circuit Court of Baltimore city. The receiver tendered a form of lease; containing the usual covenants
for repairs on the part of the lessees--together with a covenant on
his part to keep the premises insured; the lessees were also to be
liable for any injury by fire to the building' caused by their own
negligence. This form of lease the lesseearefused to accept, insisting that inasmuch as the premises were to be insured by the
receiver, and they were -to pay the extra premium consequent
upon having a steam-engine on the premises, they were entitled
to be exempted from all responsibility for injury by fire to the
premises, though occurring by their own negligence or that of
their employees; and that in case of the destruction of the building by fire, it should be rebuilt by the lessor without delay, the
rent, in case of accidental fire only, to be suspended in the meantime. The Circuit Court passed an order directing a lease in the
form suggested by the lessees. On appeal by a cestui que trust,
this order was reversed, it being Held, That in the absence of
previous express stipulations to that effect, the lessees were not
entitled to the covenants demanded by them: Bodman v. Murphy,
35 Md.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.,

Absence of Probable Cause--Definitionof Probable Cause.To support an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must
prove affirmatively that he was prosecuted, or that a prosecution

was instigated by the defendant; that it terminated in hig discharge orexoneration from the 'accusation against him; and that
it was both malicious and without probable cause on the part of
the defendant: Boyd v. Cross, 35 MId.'
Malice is a question of fact for the jury, and its existence may
be, and most generally is, infefred from the want of probable cause
for the prosecution; but the absence of probable cause is not conclusive of the presence of malice. The presumption of malice, resulting from the want of probable cause, is only primafacie, and
may be rebutted by the circumstances under which the defendant
acted. But from the most express malice, the want of probable
cause cannot be implied: Id.
The want of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact.
As to the existence of the facts relied on to constitute the want of
probable cause, that is a question for the jury; but what will

